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Abstract 
The rampant corporate failures in recent times both within and outside Nigeria make safety of investors’ wealth 
an interesting and important area of research in Accounting.  The safety investment and its growth can be 
deciphered from the trend in the earnings per share of a company. Once the earnings per share falls below 
acceptable levels the company is bound to wound up. The cases of Enron, Xerox, Adelphia et cetera 
internationally and Cadbury, NITEL, NEPA, NRC and many banks in Nigeria are very well known. Interestingly 
the Board of Directors as the top management of these corporate entities is where the bulk stops. The quality of 
the board, its efficiency and by extension the corporate performance of the entity could be affected by the size 
and composition of the Board, and frequency of meetings and regularity in attendance at meetings, as critical 
elements of corporate governance. Therefore, the question normally asked is to what extent do Board size, Board 
composition/structure, frequency of board meetings and regularity of attendance at meetings by board members 
impact the corporate performance of companies? The earlier study had used opinion survey of company 
administrators and managers to assess their perception on the impact of Board size and composition and the 
related variables on the financial performance of Non-Financial Companies quoted on the Nigerian stock 
exchange through a structured questionnaire administered to three top ranking managers/accountants in each 
company and used the Micro soft Special Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) to analyze the responses presented 
in a 5-point liker scale where the regression showed that there is a significant positive relationship between the 
Board size, composition, frequency of meetings, regularity of members’ attendance   and performance of quoted 
non financial companies. That study had been documented with a recommendation among others that the Board 
should not be unnecessarily weighty in size but more importantly, the Board should be composed more of 
outsiders with proven integrity, acumen, experience and skill in corporate management. The current  study uses 
secondary data on corporate financial performance, with a single index of Earnings Per Share (EPS) as 
dependent variable and  Board size, Board composition, Frequency of Meetings and Regularity of Members’ 
Attendance, as independent variables, all collected from Annual Financial Reports of the companies quoted on 
the stock exchange within the study period to test the hypothesis that : Board size, composition, frequency of 
meetings and regularity of members’ attendance have significant positive effect on corporate financial 
performance of quoted non – financial companies on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. The Micro soft Special 
Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 16.0 is used to do the regression analysis. It was shown that that 
there is a significant positive relationship between the Board size, composition, frequency of meetings, regularity 
of members’ attendance and performance of quoted non financial companies as in the earlier study on 
perception. With R, the correlation coefficient which has a value of 0.535, though much lower than in the 
previous study, indicates that there is a significant positive relationship between the Board size, composition, 
frequency of meetings, regularity of members’ attendance   and performance of quoted companies..  R square, 
the coefficient of determination, shows that F= 9.645 far above 2, Significance = 0.000 and Durbin-Watson = 
1.93 indicating that the variation in the performance of quoted companies is explained by the model. This study 
thus not only corroborates the earlier one but also shows more specifically that a higher percentage outside board 
membership leads to a higher earnings per share and the fewer the overall size of the Board, the higher the EPS. 
It is therefore recommended among others that the Board should not be unnecessarily weighty in size but more 
importantly, the Board should be composed more of outsiders with proven integrity, acumen, experience and 
skill in corporate management. Moreover members of the BOD should endeavourer to attend meetings more 
regularly. All these would help improve the EPS of quoted companies and reduce drastically the spate of 
corporate failures as good corporate governance stand to be engendered. 
Key words: Board of Directors, Corporate performance, corporate governance, 
European Journal of Business and Management                                                                                                                               www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) 
Vol.5, No.26, 2013 
 
187 
INTRODUCTION 
Wolfenson (1999) and Akinsulire (2006)  agree that corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of 
rights and responsibilities among different participants in the corporation such as the board, managers, 
shareholders and other stakeholders, and spells out the rules and procedures for making decisions on corporate 
affairs. This then provides the structure through which the company’s objectives are set and communicated, the 
means of attaining them as well as monitoring performance specified. It is generally also agreed that the Board 
of Directors (BOD) is central to the corporate governance mechanism in all market economies. In this regard 
Manne (1965), Alchian and Demtz (1972) and Bonnier and Bruner (1989), assert that, the Board is one of the 
most important and possibly beneficial internal mechanisms of corporate control being the ultimate stewardship 
reporter. The board is the primary means through which the shareholders excise control over the affairs of the 
company. The board is held responsible for all the activities of the company and even for the failure of other 
elements of the corporate governance chain. The shareholders are helped in this regard by statutory and 
regulatory provisions and institutions but by far the strength of the internal control mechanism is more germane 
to the success of the company than all external control measures. Since the internal control mechanism is 
essentially established by the Board, the Board thus exercises utmost control over the safety, correct and most 
economic use of the resources of the enterprise. Though, all stakeholders responsible for promoting sound 
corporate governance, not just the Board, but also the management, audit committee and regulators, are 
challenged and compelled to ensure that sound corporate governance exist (Williams, 2001). But the issues of 
structure/composition and size of the BOD as a corporate governance mechanism has continued to receive 
considerable attention from academics, market participants and regulators. This is premised on the expectation 
that these issues would exert considerable influence on the overall efficiency of the BOD and by extension the 
quality of corporate governance and firm performance. However going beyond mere expectation as seen from 
the previous perception study on this, it is germane to evaluate the extent to which BOD size has actually 
affected corporate performance to wit; the net profit, turnover, earning per share and dividend per share (as 
dependent variables), during the period covered by the study. This is the task set for itself by this paper. It 
therefore asks such questions as: to what extent has BOD size affected corporate performance? And, does the 
percentage of outside directors significantly boost corporate performance?  The paper tests hypotheses; that there 
is a negative relationship between BOD size and corporate performance and that there is a strong correlation 
between BOD composition and corporate performance. The paper is organized in five parts. . Part one of the 
paper introduces the work, part two contains the literature review, part three the methodology, while part four 
presents and discusses the findings and part five concludes. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Board of Directors (BOD) 
The Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) (1990) S. 244(1) stipulates that the Directors of companies are 
persons duly appointed by the company to direct and manage the business of the company. S. 63(3) of the Act 
puts it simply that ‘’the business of the company shall be managed by the Board of Directors’’. By managing the 
business of the company therefore, the BOD is expected to control and direct, to administer and to take charge 
of, and to carry on the concerns of the business establishment. Good corporate governance demands that the 
Directors do this stewardship assignment transparently and accountably by adhering to company fiduciary duties 
and ethics (Adekoya, 2011). After all, it is the Principal- Agency theory that creates the relationship between the 
Shareholders and the BOD. The separation of ownership and control, which occurs as a result of the introduction 
of external investors, brings to the fore the agency challenge requiring the protection of the principal, in this case 
the shareholders, through an efficient oversight function by the agent (the BOD). It is presumed that the BOD’s 
effective performance of this monitoring role could be influenced by its composition and quality, its size and 
diversity, information asymmetries and the board culture (Brennam, 2006). This becomes more critical in the 
face of a growing trend in the composition of independent BODs and critical corporate committees containing a 
strong representation of non-executive (outsider) directors, (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Mallette and 
Fowler, 1992; and Daily and Dalton, 1994). Cho and Kim (2007) describe the outside director as one who does 
not have any affiliation with large investors or the management of the company. They neither work for nor have 
professional relationships with the corporation they govern. Pass (2002), describes outsider- directors also 
known as non-executive directors as persons who take on numerous responsibilities in the company on a part-
time basis. They may sit on various key company committees such as the nominations committee, the 
remuneration committee and the audit committee. The internal directors are the opposite; they may be the core or 
large investors or their representatives or those who represent management or labor. What values does each 
category of directors bring to the table and what should be the ideal mix of internal and outside membership of 
the BOD? According to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) code of best practices of corporate 
governance in Nigeria 2003, the BOD should be composed in such a way as to ensure diversity of experience 
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without compromising compatibility, integrity, availability and independence; members of the BOD must 
possess upright personal characteristics, relevant core competencies, knowledge on board matters, a sense of 
accountability and commitment to the task of corporate institutional building.  
The outside directors ideally focus on the financial performance, seen as the benchmark of efficient and effective 
monitoring. They are more likely to dismiss poor performing CEOs than inside directors. They protect their 
personal reputations as they are given the incentive to monitor the affairs of the company. Hence their presence 
strengthens corporate governance by enhancing BOD independence from top management, greater objectivity, 
representation of multiple corporate perspectives and accountability. Along this line, Johnson et al insist that 
from the agency point of view, outsiders are more likely to carry out their responsibilities more effectively than 
insiders because the latter is likely to be reluctant to confront a CEO in a Boardroom situation. On the contrary, 
insiders would not be keen to raise the sensitive topic of CEO performance because they may in all likelihood be 
beholden to the CEO for their jobs (Zajac and Westphal, 1996).  
 
2.2 Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance is synonymous with the responsibility associated with large scale artificial persons that 
lack the capacity to manage themselves (Salomon v Salomon and CO ltd, 1897). By vesting the day to day 
running of the entity to a team of directors and senior managers who are distinct from their owners, ownership 
becomes divorced from management necessitating the guarantee for transparency, accountability and fairness in 
the management of the enterprise. Mayer, (2000) opines that corporate governance is about control and running 
of companies where concerns are raised as to who is in control, for how long and over what activities? Deakin 
and Hughes (1997) posit that corporate governance entails the connection between the internal control 
machinery of corporations and the general public’s notion of the scope of corporate accountability. Hence, it is a 
set of rules applicable to the direction and control of companies where however, management is seen to connote 
running a business and governance becomes ensuring that it is run properly (Tricker, 1984). Specifically, 
corporate governance creates a framework of goals and policies to guide an organization’s progress and forms a 
foundation for assessing Board and management performance (Adedotun, 2003). In a more elaborate tone, 
Oyediran (2003) stresses that corporate governance looks at the institutional and policy framework for 
management of corporation from the very beginnings, in entrepreneurship, through the government structures, 
company law, privatization, insolvency and to market exit. It not only depends on the legal, regulatory, 
institutional, environmental and societal interests of the communities in which it operates, but also has impact on 
the reputation and long-term success of a company. However, Adekoya 2011 notes that the responsibility for 
adopting and implementing corporate governance code lies on the company’s board of directors.  Empirical 
evidence on the impact of the size and composition of the BOD on the performance of this role is rather 
inconclusive. While Baysinger and Butler (1985) and Rosenstein and Wyatt (1997), maintain that the number of 
outsiders has positive performance implications for the firm, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Bhagat and Black 
(1999) and Dalton et al (1999) insist on the opposite. In any case, the argument continues that, the long-term 
success of corporate governance in a firm could be affected by both size and composition of the BOD. After all, 
corporate governance in Nigeria within the concept of company management and administration is seen as the 
exercise of power over the enterprise direction, the supervision and control of enterprise actions, the concern for 
the effect of the enterprise on other parties, the acceptance of a duty to be accountable and self-regulated within 
the status and jurisdiction of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. From the prism of the overall rights of 
shareholders to specific equitable treatment of marginal and minority shareholders which adequate corporate 
governance is expected to protect and guarantee, the size and composition of the BOD should be a critical factor. 
The need for the BOD to discharge its functions credibly as provided in the SEC’s Code of best practices of 
Corporate Governance (2003) should demand an appropriate size and mix of internal and outside directors. Little 
wonder that the Code inter alia, provides for the separation of the roles of Chief Executive Officer and Chairman 
of the BOD; determination of Executive Directors’ compensation by non-executive directors; schedule of 
matters reserved for the Board; the exclusion of non-executive directors in share option schemes and pension 
arrangements with the company; the establishment of a formal selection process for the appointment of non-
executive directors as a matter for the entire board; disclosure in annual reports including Directors’ Reports on 
the effectiveness of the company’s system of internal control and the going concern status of the business. On its 
part, the CAMA i990 provides that the directors of every company must prepare and present annual financial 
statements including five-year summaries, balance sheets, and profit and loss accounts; and disclose the interest 
of directors as well as the directors’ emoluments. Despite these elaborate provisions that apply across industries, 
there are industry specific provisions expected to strengthen corporate governance in Nigeria. Hence the Code of 
Corporate Governance for Banks and Other Financial Institutions in Nigeria published by the Bankers’ 
Committee. In the specific aspect of board size and composition, this code recommends that non-executive 
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directors should comprise a majority of the members of the board. It also stipulates the compulsory appointment 
of at least (2) independent directors and disclosing the names of such directors in the annual report.   
2.3 Corporate Performance 
The capacity and ability of a firm to use its assets to generate revenue from its primary mode of business depict 
its overall financial health. When this is measured periodically, it forms the basis for both horizontal and vertical 
analysis and comparison. According to Demsetz and Lehn (2004), financial performance involves measuring a 
firm’s policies and operations in monetary terms which are depicted in the firm’s return on investment, return on 
assets, value added, et cetera. That is, accounting profit ratios proxy corporate performance. Corporate 
governance has been found to correlate positively with corporate performance, (Attiye and Robina, 2007) both 
seen from these accounting ratios of the firm and the movement of its price in the stock market. While the 
accounting profit ratios are measured by the Accountant constrained only by the standards set by his profession, 
the performance as reflected by the movement of its price in the stock market is measured by the investors 
constrained by their acumen, information, optimism or pessimism and general psychology. In either case 
however, Young (2000) suggests that best governance practices exert a positive influence on firm performance 
since it prevents management and controlling investors from taking initiatives to expropriate minority investors. 
This, it is argued impacts positively on the firm’s goodwill and ability to attract equity capital from prospective 
marginal investors. Hence in considering approaches to measurement of firm level financial performance, Sanda 
et al (2003), insist that this is found in social science research based on market prices, accounting ratios and total 
factor profitability where market prices are readily obtained from national stock exchanges for all listed firms. 
While profit is a flow concept, profit margin measures the flow of profits over some period compared with 
revenue and costs and thus there could be gross profit margin, operating profit margin, return on equity et cetera. 
The relationship between corporate governance and firm’s financial performance stems from the understanding 
that economic value is driven by governance mechanisms such as the legal protection of capital, the firm’s 
competitive environment, its ownership structure, CEO-Duality, board composition and size, (the focus of this 
paper), existence of Audit Committee and financial policy (Uadiele, 2010). In this light, Gompers et al (2003) 
find that stock returns are higher for firms with strong shareholder rights as compared to firms with weak 
shareholder rights. This suggests that firms with stronger or better corporate governance provisions outperform 
those with poor governance provisions in terms of profits, capital acquisition and sales growth. They also add 
that there is substantial evidence showing that weakly governed firms experience lower performance based on 
operating performance measures, lower sales growth and net profit margins. This has been corroborated by 
Khatab et al (2011) from a study of twenty listed firms in the Karachi Stock Exchange in Pakistan. 
 
2.4 Assessment of Current Corporate Governance Issues and Corporate Performance in Nigeria. 
Whereas in the United Kingdom approaches to best practices in corporate governance reflect a deep appreciation 
that governance should promote both accountability to shareholders and the board’s ability to manage the 
company effectively and efficiently the situation in Nigeria has been different. For instance, the key features of 
the UK best practices codified by the country’s company law and the listing rules demand inter alia;  a unitary 
board with members  collectively responsible for leading the company; division of powers at the apex of the 
company hierarchy, emphasizing the distinction between running the board by the Chairman and running the 
company by the CEO; a balance of executive and independent non-executive directors where for larger 
companies, at least 50% of the board members should by independent non-executive directors and for smaller 
companies at least two independent directors; formal and transparent procedures for appointing directors, with 
all appointments ratified by shareholders; regular evaluation of the effectiveness of the board and its committees; 
formal and transparent procedures for setting executive remuneration, including a remuneration committee made 
up of independent directors and an advisory vote for shareholders; and a significant proportion of executive 
remuneration linked to performance. The illicit activities and insider dealings of most Nigerian Bank Chief 
Executives and directors as revealed by the Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria in 2009 shows a striking 
different scenario and summarize the level of decadence in corporate governance in Nigerian companies. 
Corporate governance is yet at a rudimentary stage in Nigeria with less than 40% of quoted companies including 
banks having recognized the codes of corporate governance, (CBN, 2006). But Nganga et el (2003) insist that 
corporate governance is a crucial ingredient in the process of encouraging domestic investment as well as inflow 
of foreign direct investment in Nigeria. They further lament that corporate governance practices in Nigeria 
reflect systemic governance problems including the inability to ensure effective capacity, constraints by 
administrators and ineffective implementation of laws. This leads to limited economic growth (Suberu and 
Aremu, 2010). And in realization of the need to align with international best practices, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) in collaboration with the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC), inaugurated a 
seventeen (17) member committee in June 2000 in Nigeria headed by Atedo Peterside, to review and identify 
weaknesses in the current corporate governance practices in Nigeria and make recommendations for 
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improvement. According to Inyang (2009), the members of the committee were selected to cut across relevant 
sectors of the economy including members of professional organization, the private sector and regulatory 
agencies. The committee submitted a draft code, which was widely publicized throughout the country and 
reviewed in major financial centers of Lagos, Abuja and Port Harcourt to elicit stakeholders’ input prior to 
finalization. The final report was approved in 2003 by the boards of SEC and CAC. The release of the 2003 code 
marked a watershed in the development of good corporate governance practices in Nigeria. Essentially, the Code 
stipulated among other things, the separation of the roles of Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board 
and most importantly, as stated earlier, that the board should be composed in such a way as to ensure diversity of 
experience without compromising compatibility, integrity, availability and independence. It remains to be seen 
how far these provisions are being implemented. It also remains to be ascertained, the extent to which the roles 
of the board as stipulated in the Code, to wit: strategic planning; selection, performance appraisal and 
compensation of senior executives; succession planning; communication with shareholders; ensuring the 
integrity of financial controls and reports; ensuring that ethical standards are maintained and that the company 
complies with the laws of the federation; are being carried out under different sizes and composition of the 
board.  
 
 3. METHODOLOGY 
The paper is an ex-post factor research. Secondary sources of data on the performances of the companies are 
used for analysis. This study uses secondary data on corporate financial performance proxy:  earning per share 
and dividend per share; and price earnings ratio; as dependent variables and  Board sizes, Board composition, 
frequency of meetings ,and regularity of members’ attendance, as independent variables, all collected from 
annual financial reports of the companies quoted on the stock exchange within the study period to test the 
hypothesis that : Board size, composition, frequency of meetings and regularity of members’ attendance have 
significant positive effects on corporate financial performance of quoted non – financial companies on the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange. A total number of 108 quoted companies being the actual number in the list during the 
period, cutting across AGRICULTURE/AGRO-ALLIED 4 , AUTOMOBILE & TYRE 2, AVIATION 2, 
BREWERIES 3,  BUILDING MATERIALS 4, CHEMICALS & PAINTS 9, COMPUTER & OFFICE EQUIP 
3, COMMERCIAL SERVICES 4, CONGLOMERATES 8, CONSTRUCTION 7, CONSUMER GOODS 14, 
FOOT WEAR & ACCESSORIES 1, INDUSTRIAL DOMESTIC PRODUCTS 7, INFORMATION 
COMMUNICATION TELL 3, LEASING 3, MEDIA 2, PACKAGING 3, PETROLEUM MKT 7, PRINTING & 
PUBLISHING 3, REAL ESTATE 1, REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT 1, ROAD TRANSPORT 1, TEXTILES 1, 
EMERGING MKT 2, HOTEL AND TORISM 3, and HEALTH 10 is used. The Micro soft Special Package for 
Social Sciences (SPSS) is used to do the regression analysis.  
 
4. PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS AND DISCUSION 
Table 4.1 shows the financial performance of the 108 non financial companies quoted on the Nigerian stock 
exchange between 2006 and 2012. The names of the companies have been deliberately removed. However, they 
are still reported in their different sections.  Apparently the Boards have membership that range from 6 torq6t 15 
with the mean at 6. With regards to outside directors, the range is from 2 to 8 with a mean of 3. Essentially, the 
petroleum, consumer goods and the conglomerates have higher number of Board members as well as a higher 
percentage of outsiders. These companies also have higher frequency of meetings and higher percentage of 
attendance by members.  For the majority of the companies that have very few outside directors, it is difficult to 
have a wide range of expertise and experienced board members. In the same vein, integrity, honesty and 
professionalism may easily be compromised making the policy formulation, monitoring and control inefficient. 
Again the table shows that majority of the companies had very low financial performance going by their earnings 
per share, dividend per share and price earnings ratio. Notably, the companies have been categorized into their 
various sections and it is seen that those in the petroleum, consumer goods and conglomerates in that order 
outperformed the rest with the exception of the real estate investment company with a high earning per share and 
another company in the media though with a high earning per share but had not yet declared any dividend. 
Interestingly, these companies whose actual identities, like the rest have not been disclosed appear to have a 
better corporate governance indices of larger board membership, more non executive directors, greater frequency 
of holding and attending meetings and inclusion of relevant professionals in the board more than others. 
However, the actual impact of these board characteristics is better appreciated from the result of the test of 
hypotheses.  
Main research hypothesis: Board size, composition, frequency of meetings and regularity of members’ 
attendance has significant positive effect on corporate financial performance of quoted non – financial 
companies on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. 
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DEPENDENT VARIABLES: CORPORATE FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE PROXIED BY: 
       1. EARNING PER SHARE (EPS)  
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: 
1.  BOARD SIZE-  
2.  BOARD COMPOSITION (NUMBER OF OUTSIDE DIRECTORS) 
3.  FREQUENCY OF MEETINGS 
4.  REGULARITY OF MEMBERS’ ATTENDANCE (%) 
TEST OF CORRELATION AND REGRESSION USING THE SECONDARY DATA 
 
 
Table 4.2  Regression 
 
Notes 
Output Created 26-Sep-2013 11:35:45 
Comments  
Input Active Dataset DataSet0 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data 
File 108 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are treated as 
missing. 
Cases Used Statistics are based on cases with no 
missing values for any variable used. 
Syntax REGRESSION 
  /DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV 
CORR SIG N 
  /MISSING LISTWISE 
  /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS CI BCOV 
R ANOVA CHANGE ZPP 
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) 
  /NOORIGIN 
  /DEPENDENT EPS 
  /METHOD=ENTER BS OD FM RA 
  /RESIDUALS DURBIN. 
 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.171 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.095 
Memory Required 2300 bytes 
Additional Memory Required 
for Residual Plots 0 bytes 
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Table 4.3 Data Set(o)  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
EPS 1.5536 3.22272 101 
BS 7.7723 2.35746 101 
OD 3.6931 1.64160 101 
FM 4.0990 .72808 101 
RA 66.9406 9.64347 101 
    
Table 4.4 Correlation 
Correlations 
  EPS BS OD FM RA 
Pearson Correlation EPS 1.000 .431 .501 .371 .495 
BS .431 1.000 .917 .567 .750 
OD .501 .917 1.000 .620 .783 
FM .371 .567 .620 1.000 .723 
RA .495 .750 .783 .723 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) EPS . .000 .000 .000 .000 
BS .000 . .000 .000 .000 
OD .000 .000 . .000 .000 
FM .000 .000 .000 . .000 
RA .000 .000 .000 .000 . 
N EPS 101 101 101 101 101 
BS 101 101 101 101 101 
OD 101 101 101 101 101 
FM 101 101 101 101 101 
RA 101 101 101 101 101 
The pearson correlation shows earnings per share positively related to all the independent variables. However, 
only the relationship with outside directors is significant at 0.501.  This is closely followed by the correlation of 
0.495 with regularity of attendance.  As for frequency of meetings and board size, the correlation coefficients are 
0.371 and 0.431. These are all weak positive relationships. 
Table 4.5 Variables Entered/Removed 
Variables Entered/Removedb 
Model Variables Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 RA, FM, BS, ODa . Enter 
a. All requested variables entered.  
b. Dependent Variable: EPS  
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Table 4.6 Modes summary of the regression test with EPS as dependent variable and Board characteristics as 
independent variables. 
Model Summaryb 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .535a .287 .257 2.77801 .287 9.645 4 96 .000 1.934 
a. Predictors: (Constant), RA, FM, 
BS, OD 
       
b. Dependent Variable: EPS        
Table 4.6 shows the model summary which reports the strength of the relationship between the model and the 
dependent variable. Here R is 0.535 indicating a strong positive relationship. The Dependent variable which is 
earning per share is strongly related to the predictors; board size, number of outside directors, frequency of 
meetings and regularity of members attendance.  But the R Square which is the coefficient of determination is 
0.257 showing that less than half of the variation in Earnings per Share is explained by the model as a whole. But 
the result of the test of the hypothesis is significant at 0.000 signifying that the dependent variable EPS is 
significantly affected by the independent variables. Hence the EPS of quoted companies in Nigeria is influenced 
by positive characteristics of the board of directors such as a large size, inclusion of more non executive directors 
with varied expertise and experience, and sound integrity;   frequency of holding meetings and regular 
attendance at meetings by all members. 
 
Table 4.7 ANOVA result of the regression analysis 
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 297.727 4 74.432 9.645 .000a 
Residual 740.864 96 7.717   
Total 1038.591 100    
a. Predictors: (Constant), RA, FM, BS, OD    
b. Dependent Variable: EPS     
The ANOVA table reports a significant F statistic, 0.000 indicating that using the model is better than guessing 
the effect of the predictors: Board Size, number of non executive directors, frequency of meetings and regularity 
of attendance by members; on the earnings per share of quoted companies in Nigeria. That is, the acceptability of 
the model from a statistical perspective is significant. The F value of 9.645 is greater than 2 . Hence while 
74.432 variations in earnings per share is accounted for by this model, only 7.717 of the variation is not 
accounted for by the model. 
Table 4.3 therefore, shows that the result is robust and significant as a very high proportion of the change in the 
dependent variable is as a result of the effects of these independent variables and neither due to chance nor any 
other extraneous variable. 
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Table 4.8 Coefficient results. 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval for B Correlations 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Zero-
order Partial Part 
1 (Constant) -5.831 2.522  -2.312 .023 -10.837 -.825    
BS -.322 .299 -.236 -1.078 .284 -.916 .271 .431 -.109 -.093 
OD .975 .460 .497 2.122 .036 .063 1.888 .501 .212 .183 
FM -.074 .558 -.017 -.132 .895 -1.182 1.034 .371 -.014 -.011 
RA .098 .054 .295 1.837 .069 -.008 .205 .495 .184 .158 
a. Dependent Variable: 
EPS 
         
To determine the relative importance of the significant predictors, we look at the standardized coefficients. The 
composition of the board in favour of non executive directors represented as OD is 0.497 which shows that it has 
the greatest impact of all the board characteristics. Outsider members tend to boast of more diversification of 
expertise, higher integrity, and more objectivity in the management of the affairs of the company. This is 
followed by the regularity of attendance to meetings with beta = 0.295. The more regular members attend 
meetings the greater their contribution of ideas and participation in the management of the enterprise. Of note is 
the very low contribution of the number of meetings held in a year. This has a beta of -0.017 which shows that 
the number of meetings could increase board expenses and impact negatively on the earnings per share of the 
company. This equally applies to share board size which  tends to be non cost effective if the composition is not 
right and members do not contribute meaningfully through diversified expertise and regularity in attendance at 
meetings.    
Table 4.9 Coefficient Correlations. 
Coefficient Correlationsa 
Model RA FM BS OD 
1 Correlations RA 1.000 -.492 -.150 -.243 
FM -.492 1.000 .078 -.137 
BS -.150 .078 1.000 -.803 
OD -.243 -.137 -.803 1.000 
Covariances RA .003 -.015 -.002 -.006 
FM -.015 .312 .013 -.035 
BS -.002 .013 .089 -.110 
OD -.006 -.035 -.110 .211 
a. Dependent Variable: EPS    
There is a negative correlation between frequency of meetings and regularity of attendance by members. As 
more meetings are held, the regularity of attendance to meetings drop. There is also a negative correlation 
between regularity of attendance and board size (-0.150) and outside directors (-0.243) though all are 
insignificant. Only board size and frequency of meetings correlate positively at 0.078. But again this is a weak 
correlation. The only significant relationship is between board size and outside directors. But surprisingly, this is 
negative suggesting that mere increase in board size does not guarantee higher non executive directors in the 
board. It does appear that the larger the size of the board and the more there are outside board members, the less 
frequent the board meets and in the same vein the less the regularity in attendance at meetings by members. It 
was found that the average membership of the boards of these companies is 10 while meetings are averagely 
held every quarter resulting to 4 meetings in a year. Though sitting allowances, transportation cost, and attendant 
board expenses increase with board size, frequency of board meetings and regularity of attendance, but actual 
remuneration of outside board members tended to be less than the remuneration of executive directors. Outside 
directors cost less generally than executive directors and this improves the return on equity. Little wonder that 
the board size and composition correlated more significantly and positively with return on equity than profit 
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margin even when both profit margin and return on equity are found to significantly and positively correlate each 
other.   
 
Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -.6209 6.6399 1.5536 1.72548 101 
Residual -5.77989 13.77049 .00000 2.72188 101 
Std. Predicted Value -1.260 2.948 .000 1.000 101 
Std. Residual -2.081 4.957 .000 .980 101 
a. Dependent Variable: EPS    
 
5. CONCLUSION 
The study was done using secondary data collected from Annual Reports respectively of 72 financial companies 
quoted in the Nigerian Stock Exchange during the period covered by the study. Using the correlation and 
regression statistics analysis through Microsoft Special Package for Social Science (SPSS) model 16.0, the data 
were analyzed and hypothesis tested to find that Board Size, Board Composition, Frequency of Board Meetings 
and Regularity of attendance at Board meetings all positively affect the earnings per share of quoted non-
financial companies on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. There appears to be a general conflict of interest of the 
shareholders and that of Executive Directors which is inimical to the maximization of shareholders’ wealth. 
Little wonder that shareholders have a disdain for the excesses of Executive Directors and usually prefer a higher 
proportion of outside directors. Similarly, a larger sized board incorporates not only a greater number of experts 
from different fields but also accommodates more credible, transparent, selfless and dedicated non executive 
directors. Arbitrariness, autocratic, intimidation and over bearing attitudes of either the Chairman of the Board or 
the Chief Executive Officer of the company are usually cubed and checkmated by a large and Non Executive 
Directors- dominated Board. The probability of the Chairman doubling as Chief Executive Officer of the 
company is reduced by a larger sized and outside directors dominated board. Essentially this contributes 
positively to corporate governance through enhanced transparency and accountability. A sound human capital 
with robust intellect and experience from outside is therefore recommended by this paper for company boards in 
addition to regularity of attendance at meetings by board members so as to contribute more meaningfully to the 
overall management of the companies. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 4.1 Average Corporate performances of non financial companies quoted on the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange and accompanying Board characteristics. 
S/N Company Board 
Size 
(BS) 
Outside 
Directors 
(OD) 
No of 
Meetings per 
year(FM) 
Average 
Attendance to 
meetings % (RA) 
Dividend per 
Share(DPS) 
Earnings per 
Share(EPS) 
P.E. 
Ratio 
 AGRICULTURE/AGRO-ALLIED        
 1 6 3 4 60 0.50 6.06 3.20 
 2 6 2 4 56 0.50 1.88 3.90 
 3 4 2 5 60 0.30 0.03 16.67 
 4 4 2 3 60 0.03 0.01 4.30 
 AUTOMOBILE & TYRE        
 5 6 2 3 55 0.15 0.00 0.00 
 6 5 2 3 60 1.10 0.16 10.31 
 AVIATION        
 7 7 3 3 56 - 0.80 7.25 
 8 6 3 3 58 0.15 0.51 3.82 
 BREWERIES        
 9 12 6 5 80 10.00 12.16 16.86 
 10 10 5 5 72 1.25 4.39 19.36 
 11 8 4 4 75 0.08 0.00 0.00 
 BUILDING MATERIALS        
 12 6 3 4 60 0.30 1.35 11.41 
 13 8 5 4 75 2.25 7.19 13.35 
 14 6 3 4 60 0.04 1.45 4.55 
 15 7 3 4 65 0.25 0.87 45.40 
 CHEMICALS & PAINTS        
 16 8 5 4 70 0.70 1.81 5.17 
 17 6 3 4 67 0.45 0.00 0.00 
 18 6 3 3 60 0.10 0.00 0.00 
 19 10 6 5 89 2.00 1.69 11.78 
 20 6 2 4 60 - 0.00 0.00 
 21 6 2 4 60 0.02 0.00 0.00 
 22 6 3 4 64 0.07 0.00 0.00 
 23 6 3 4 67 0.06 0.16 4.44 
 24 10 5 4 71 0.12 0.29 17.62 
 COMPUTER & OFFICE EQUIP        
 25 6 3 4 70 0.11 0.00 0.00 
 26 10 6 5 88 3.00 7.13 0.73 
 27 6 2 4 64 - 0.04 12.50 
 COMMERCIAL SERVICES        
 28 8 4 5 65 0.30 0.54 4.28 
 29 6 3 4 60 0.05 0.04 12.50 
 30 6 3 4 61 0.05 0.10 36.30 
 31 6 3 4 62 0.10 0.03 28.00 
 CONGLOMERATES        
 32 8 4 4 63 0.12 0.28 6.79 
 33 8 4 4 63 0.10 0.00 0.00 
 34 10 6 5 75 0.86 1.29 23.68 
 35 12 5 4 63 0.10 0.05 122.20 
 36 10 6 5 77 1.30 6.87 4.56 
 37 10 6 5 76 1.10 1.38 19.93 
 38 8 3 4 65 - 0.22 3.45 
 39 9 4 4 64 0.10 0.34 18.91 
 CONSTRUCTION        
 40 8 3 4 63 0.10 0.00 0.00 
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 41 8 3 4 64 0.20 0.00 0.00 
 42 12 7 5 80 2.00 3.15 14.97 
 43 9 4 5 66 0.20 0.00 0.00 
 44 8 5 5 68 0.50 3.66 1.54 
 45 6 3 4 60 0.01 0.01 50.00 
 46 12 6 4 60 0.50 4.50 21.22 
 CONSUMER GOODS        
 47 15 8 5 85 2.00 3.81 12.60 
 48 cad 8 3 5 80 1.30 0.36 36.84 
 49 12 6 5 86 2.00 4.50 13.00 
 50 12 6 4 68 0.50 0.73 5.73 
 51 15 7 6 90 10.60 16.18 24.99 
 52 10 6 4 60 0.50 1.52 26.90 
 53 7 4 4 60 0.03 0.06 84.33 
 54 10 6 5 69 0.90 2.09 10.28 
 55 8 4 4 67 0.60 0.71 9.58 
 56 dangote 10 7 4 65 0.50 0.54 11.76 
 57 7 3 3 60 0.06 0.01 50.00 
 58 8 3 3 60 0.20 0.00 0.00 
 59 8 3 3 61 0.13 0.26 10.28 
 60 8 3 3 60 0.03 0.00 0.10 
 FOOT WEAR & ACCESSORIES        
 61 8 3 3 62 0.15 0.19 18.32 
 INDUSTRIAL DOMESTIC 
PRODUCTS 
       
 62 7 3 4 65 0.36 0.89 7.82 
 63 7 3 4 65 0.30 0.70 8.50 
 64 7 3 3 61 0.20 0.00 0.00 
 65 6 2 3 60 0.05 0.00 0.00 
 66 6 2 3 60 0.05 0.29 38.45 
 67 6 2 3 60 - - - 
- -68 6 2 3 60 - - - 
 INFORMATION 
COMMUNICATION TELL 
       
 69 6 2 3 60 0.00 - - 
 70 6 3 3 60 0.03 0.00 0.00 
 71 - - -  - - - 
 LEASING        
 72 6 2 3 62 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 73 6 2 3 60 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 74 6 2 3 63 0.08 0.20 8.55 
 MEDIA        
 75 6 2 3 60 - 0.00 0.00 
 76 10 6 4 95 10.00 - - 
 PACKAGING        
 77 8 3 4 70 0.36 1.81 8.18 
 78 6 2 4 62 0.13 0.07 42.29 
 79 6 2 4 64 0.20 1.36 11.05 
 PETROLEUM MKT        
 80 12 7 5 89 5.20 0.00 0.00 
 81 12 5 5 78 1.00 2.38 16.03 
 82 7 3 5 60 0.08 0.00 0.00 
 83 12 7 5 90 7.00 13.68 10.31 
 84 12 7 5 94 8.28 15.44 14.79 
 85 7 3 4 60 0.01 0.03 19.33 
 86 14 8 5 97 18.35 0.86 0.49 
 PRINTING & PUBLISHING        
 87 6 3 4 60 0.50 0.65 11.65 
 88 7 4 4 63 0.40 0.37 16.65 
 89 7 4 4 67 0.70 0.33 11.15 
 REAL ESTATE        
 90 6 3 4 66 0.50 1.24 13.87 
 REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT        
 91 10 6 6 98 97.00 10.61 9.14 
 ROAD TRANSPORT        
 92 6 2 4 60 0.03 0.01 69.00 
 TEXTILES        
 93 6 2 4 62 0.10 0.00 0.00 
 EMERGING MKT        
European Journal of Business and Management                                                                                                                               www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) 
Vol.5, No.26, 2013 
 
199 
 94 - - - - - - - 
 95 - - - - - - - 
 HOTEL AND TORISM        
 96 6 2 4 60 0.10 0.96 2.36 
 97 6 2 4 60 - 0.00 0.00 
 98 6 2 4 61 0.07 0.22 34.09 
 HEALTH        
 99 6 2 4 60 0.03 0.00 0.00 
 100 7 3 4 64 0.15 0.15 48.27 
 101 6 2 4 61 0.03 0.00 0.00 
 102 8 4 5 75 1.20 2.55 10.59 
 103 6 3 4 67 0.40 0.18 16.61 
 104 6 3 4 67 0.50 0.07 16.86 
 105 6 2 4 64 0.20 0.00 0.00 
 106 6 2 4 63 0.10 0.21 5.19 
 107 6 3 4 63 0.08 0.00 0.00 
 108 6 3 6 70 0.50 0.25 8.50 
SOURCE: Nigerian Stock Exchange Annual Reports several years. 
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